The distribution of national income between capital and labor has become more unequal as has the distribution within labor. At the same time that inequality rose, consumer debt and household economic distress grew, too. The evidence on a positive link between rising inequality and innovation is not supported by the data. The data either suggest no connection or a potential negative link. In comparison, the link between growing inequality and aggregate demand is somewhat ambiguous. One way to clarify this ambiguity is the possibility that debt has increased and that it has increased more among low income households, particularly in the form of credit cards and non-bank credit. We find that credit card debt is especially sensitive to changes in inequality and that rising inequality may thus have contributed to rising personal bankruptcies.
Introduction
For the better part of the past three decades, the U.S. economy has been characterized by a growing income disparity. Rising inequality has taken two forms. The share of national income that has gone to employee compensation has tended to decline, and the distribution of this shrinking share of the pie has become more unequal.
Because the distributional changes are not insubstantial in the aggregate, it is possible that the economy has also been affected. The connection between rising inequality and productivity growth is theoretically contested, with arguments in favor of both a positive and a negative link. In comparison, the theoretical and empirical evidence lends some support to the notion that greater inequality can depress demand growth at the macro level, but micro data cast some doubt on this finding. One resolution to this ambiguity may have been a rise in more consumer borrowing, especially for low income households. However, this could also increase economic distress for households, particularly if economic mobility was limited.
The rest of the paper is proceeds as follows. In section II, we present some background data on the relevant trends for inequality between labor and quality and within labor, as well as on household indebtedness and household financial distress. In section III, we briefly discuss the causes of the rising inequality in the U.S., followed by a literature overview over the possible macro economic consequences of rising inequality in section IV. In section V, we discuss the evidence on the link between inequality and innovation and aggregate demand. Section VI presents empirical evidence on the link between rising inequality, consumer indebtedness and economic distress. The paper ends with some concluding remarks in section VII.
II. Inequality Trends
The empirical trends point towards two different types of inequality that have been growing in the U.S. One is inequality between capital and labor, with capital's share of national income rising and labor's share falling. The other is an increasingly unequal income distribution of labor income. One result that seems to be directly borne out of this growth in inequality is a growing indebtedness of households to maintain their consumption levels. Alongside rising inequality, the financial distress of many households has also grown.
II.1 Rising Profit Shares and Declining Labor Shares of National Income
A striking characteristic of the last economic recovery in the U.S. was a rapidly growing gap between supply and demand. Economic growth and employment diverged because historically weak demand growth did not keep pace with productivity growth 1 . The basic economic reflection of the divergence between supply and demand growth was a stark difference in rising profits and laggard employee compensation. While profits recovered handsomely, compensation growth lagged far behind that of previous 1 All comparisons are for nine quarters or 28 months after the start of the recovery. recoveries (figure 1) (Bivens and Weller, 2004a; Weller, 2004a) . The result of the reversal in fortunes of labor and capital was that households borrowed record amounts to maintain their consumption (Weller, 2004a) . However, businesses, not expecting strong sales growth due to low compensation gains, did not ratchet up investment quickly . Real investment declined for nine quarters in a row, starting with the first quarter of 2001, marking its longest decline since WWII. Even when investment rebounded, much of the initial gains were concentrated in a few information technology sectors, rather than to constitute a broad investment boom (Weller, 2004b) . Instead, much of the additional resources were used for uses other than productive investments, such as share repurchases and dividend pay-outs (Bivens and Weller, 2004a; Weller, 2004b) .
The 'job loss' recovery, though, was the culmination of a few long-run trends. Since the mid-1970s, productivity growth has outpaced wage and compensation growth (figure 2). Over the period from 1947 to the middle of 1975, productivity and real hour compensation grew apart by a total of 6.0%. In comparison, though, from the middle of 1975 to early 2004 -an equally long period of time -productivity grew 25.7% faster than real hourly compensation. The increasing divergence in productivity growth and real hourly compensation was also reflected in greater profitability, compared to the earlier post-war period. While the profit share on average was quite similar between the earlier period, from 1947 to 1975, compared to the later period -6.7% as compared to 6.5%, respectively -the trend pointed towards a more rapidly rising profit share in the latter period than in the former (Bivens and Weller, 2004b; Wolff, 2003) .
We consider four different measures for profit shares that highlight the effects of taxes and net interest on corporate profitability by including or excluding corporate taxes and by including or excluding net interest. Profit measures that include net interest were higher after the mid-1970s than before, regardless of whether taxes were included and regardless of the exact time period under investigation (table 1) 2 . The higher profit rates and profit shares were achieved by consistent and sometimes accelerating growth after the mid-1970s. After tax profit rates and shares, including net interest earnings, already saw the strongest growth, compared to other profit measures in the earlier sample periods. They continued to grow in the second sub-period, but at a slower pace. For instance, instead of an average monthly increase of 0.05 percentage points in the after tax profit share, the gain slowed to a monthly average of 0.01 percentage points after the middle of 1975. The trends of profit shares are reflected in the trends of labor shares. Although the averages do not differ or are even greater in the latter period, the trends tell a different story. Regardless of how the labor share is measured, either with proprietors' income or without, it declined in the latter period, whereas it grew in the earlier period. The declines were especially pronounced after 2001 (table 1).
II.2 Inequality within Labor
Since the 1970s, inequality within the distribution of labor income has also increased, regardless of whether we measure economic inequality in terms of earnings, income, or wealth. Inequality can be measured relatively-the ratio of incomes at the top compared to those at the bottom or the share of workers earning different percentages of the median wage-or it can be measured absolutely-how many workers are earning below poverty wages and how many are above a certain threshold. Inequality has increased along both dimensions.
We focus first on wage inequality because wages and salaries make up the bulk of family income. However, research has found that shifts in the distribution of earnings are not necessarily the most important factor in explaining changes in the distribution of earnings. Over the past 25 years, changes in the distribution of other kinds of income (interest, dividends, and rent) have played just as an important role. The severity of the inequality problem is heightened by decreases in economic mobility at the same time. Overall, the past few decades have seen a dramatic shift of income away from labor and away from low-wage earners and low-income families.
II.2.1 Wage Inequality
In the past decades, wage inequality rose sharply, both within groups and across groups. The sharpest increases occurred during the 1980s: from the economic peak in 1979 to the next peak in 1989, workers in the bottom 10 th percentile saw their wages fall by 14.1% while those in the 95 th percentile saw their wages rise by 8.1%. Inequality also increased between workers at the median and those at the top, as wages for the median worker grew by 0.0% over that same period (Mishel et al., 2003) . The overall trend was for the top and bottom to pull away from each other, while the middle saw little change.
Over the 1990s, the growth in wage inequality slowed. Between 1989 and 2000, the most recent economic peak, wages increased by 13.1% for those in the bottom 10 th percentile and increased by 16.6% for those in the 95 th percentile. Inequality between the top and the middle increased more so than between those at the top and bottom, as the median worker saw their wages rise by only 5.9%. Much of the slowing of inequality occurred during the latter half of the 1990s, as unemployment dipped below 5%. Between 1995 and 2000, wages for those at the bottom of the wage distribution actually saw their wages rise faster than those at the top for the first time in decades (Mishel et al., 2003) .
Researchers have sought to explain this overall rise in wage inequality by looking to whether the increases have been primarily across-groups or within groups. If overall inequality rose primarily because of across-group inequality, then it would be due to factors specific to particular groups, such as discrimination. However, if inequality has been primarily driven by within-group differences, then the problems are more generalized. The general consensus is that there has been an increase in both across-and within-group inequality. While across-group inequality has increased in terms of educational attainment, it has not increased substantially across African Americans and whites, while gender inequality has actually attenuated.
Across-group wage inequality declined among male and female workers over the past three decades, mostly because male wages fell during the 1970s and 1980s. Over the period from 1975 to 1996, average male wages stagnated, while average female wages rose by about one-fifth. Even once wages are regression-adjusted to control for educational and experience, the gender gap closed from 47% in 1975 47% in to 27% in 1993 47% in . However, since 1993 , the gender pay gap has remained unchanged, hovering at around 25% (Gottschalk and Danziger, 2003) .
The inequality gap between African-American and white workers stayed relatively constant over the past three decades. Controlling for personal characteristics, among women, the black/white gap was virtually non-existent in the late 1970s, however it increased to 4% by 2001. Among men, the black/white gap was 14% in 1975, rising to about 20% in the early 1980s. It came back down to 15% by 2001.
Inequality has increased across educational attainment levels. Economists think that human capital, that is the education and training experiences of the worker, is correlated with a worker's productivity, which, in turn, determines their wage. Thus, there is an expectation of inequality across educational attainment levels. However, there is not an expectation of an increase in this inequality over time, which is what has happened. In 2003, college-educated men earned 41.5% more than high-school-educated men, compared to a college premium of only 25.3% in 1973. For women, the increase was less dramatic: in 2003, college-educated women earned 46.1% more than highschool-educated women, compared to a 37.7% premium in 1973 (Mishel et al., 2005) .
Using regression-adjusted wages, researchers have found that most of the increase in educational inequality occurred between the late 1970s and the early 1990s. Since 1992, the gap between high-school and college-education workers has been relatively flat among both men and women, although there is slight upward trend, more so for men than women (Gottschalk and Danziger, 2003) .
Another way of evaluating wage inequality is to examine the within-group differences. Over the past few decades, this kind of inequality has increased alongside across-group inequality. As with across-group inequality, the largest increases in withingroup inequality occurred during the 1970s and 80s. Among both men and women, the residual wage inequality in hourly wages at the 10 th percentile fell precipitously between 1975 and the late 1990s. A person at the 10 th % of the distribution in the late 1980s had earnings roughly 25% lower than a similar person in 1975. For individuals at the 90 th percentile, wages were about 10% higher in the mid-1980s, compared to 1975, but stopped increasing during the 1990s (Gottschalk and Danziger, 2003) .
II.2.2 Income Inequality
Since most American families derive the bulk of their income from wages, trends in income inequality closely mirror wage inequality. Figure 1 shows that over the period from 1947 to 1979, annual growth in inflation-adjusted family income was similar across quintiles. However, Figure 2 shows that during the period from 1979 to the present, those in the top quintile, and in particular the top five percent, saw their family income grow significantly faster than those in the lower income quintiles. Recent research using tax returns (which allows us to see what is happening in the top one percent, which is top-coded in survey data) has found that between 1973 and 2000, the average real income of the bottom 90% of American taxpayers fell by 7% while the income of the top one percent grew by 148% (Piketty and Saez, 2001 ).
As a result of unequal growth in incomes, inequality among American households is currently at its highest level since the U.S. Census Bureau began conducting its annual survey of household income. The highest income households have been pulling away from those in the middle and bottom, while the ratio between the bottom and middleincome households has remained at about the same level (Boushey, 2004) .
The ratio of income of households at the 90 th percentile-where 90% of households have income below that level and 10% have income above that level-to households at the 10 th percentile rose from 10.75 in 2002 10.75 in , up to 11.22 in 2003 10.75 in . Back in 1967 , the first year for which data are available, that ratio was only 9.04. Thus, over the past 35 years, households at the top have seen their income increase by more than twice the total amount of households at the bottom (Census, 2004a) .
While the top has pulled away from the bottom, the top has also been pulling away from the middle. Households at the 80 th percentile now have over twice the income (2.01 times) of households at the 50 th percentile. Back in 1967, this ratio was only 1.66. The gap between households at the bottom and middle has remained relatively constant, at 0.42 in both 1967 and 2003. Similarly, the ratio of the income limit for the top 5% of income earners to the bottom 20% rose from 6.3 in 1967 to 8.6 in 2003(figure 3). Also, the annual increases almost doubled after 1980. From 1967 to 1980, the ratio of income cut-offs increased annually by 0.6%, whereas it rose by 1.0% on average each year from 1980 to 2003. In comparison, the ratio of the income limits for the bottom 20% to the middle percentile stayed fairly constant at about 0.42. Other measures of inequality, such as the Gini coefficient and Atkinson and Theil measures, also show increases in inequality over the past few decades (Census, 2004a ).
In the aggregate, rising income inequality meant that more income became concentrated at the top of the income scale and less income at the bottom. The share of total income accruing to the 20% of households at the top of the income scale rose from 43.8% in 1967 to 49.8% in 2003. In comparison, the share of total income going to the 20% of households at the bottom of the income scale fell from 4.0% to 3.4% over the same period. Interestingly, the aggregate income share of the bottom 20% of households actually rose until 1980, when it reached 4.3%, whereas the aggregate share of income accruing to the top 20% fell slightly until 1980, when it reached 43.7% (figure 4).
As with wage inequality, the largest increases in income inequality occurred during the 1980s, however even though low-income families saw income gains during the 1990s (unlike the 1980s), income inequality did continue to rise during the 1990s because of larger gains among high-income families. Between 1979 and 1989, rising inequality was the result of large increases in income among high-income families and declining income among lower income families. During the 1990s, income among lowerincome families started to rise, but higher-income families saw their incomes rise even faster. Between 1989 and 2000, among married-couple families with children, income of those in the bottom fifth of the income distribution rose by 8.8%, compared to 14.1% among those in the top fifth (Mishel et al., 2005) . This sharp rise in income inequality over the past three decades occurred even as families put more family members into the workplace. Back in 1973, most mothers did not work outside the home, while by 2000, most mothers did hold a paying job. The increase in hours worked by wives was greater among families in the bottom fifth of the income distribution. Between 1979 and 2000, wives in families with children increased their hours by 43.9%, compared to a 27.4% increase in hours among wives in families in the top fifth. Within married-couple families with children, inequality would have increased even more without the contribution of wives' income. Between 1979 and 2000, among families in the bottom fifth, income would have fallen by 13.9% without the earnings of wives, rather than rising by 7.5%; among families in the top fifth, income would have increased by 51.5%, rather than 63.0% (Mishel et al., 2005) .
Even though wages account for most of family income, decompositions in the changes of income inequality find that changes in income inequality have not been entirely driven by changes in the distribution of earnings or the increase in hours and earnings of wives. Gottschalk and Danziger (2003) decompose family income into earnings of the (male) head of household, earnings of all other family members, government transfers (not including taxes), and income from dividends, interest, rents, and other income sources. They find that between 1975 and 2001 the share of the coefficient of variation (a measure of inequality) due to changes in head's earnings grew slightly, but grew more so due to changes in other family member's earnings and "other" income (table 2). It is notable that the government transfers reduced inequality in 1975, but did not in 2001, which may the result of recent policy changes, such as welfare reform. However, this data do not take into account the Earned Income Tax Credit, which has been a significant source of income for low-income working families.
Capital income as a share of personal income doubled from 7.1% in early 1947 to 14.1% in the second quarter of (BEA, 2004a . However, the assets underlying these income streams are fairly unequally distributed. For instance, Wolff (2002) reported that the bottom 40% of households had negative financial net worth in 1998, and that they had little total net worth. Further, Wolff (2004) reported that wealth inequality rose from 1998 to 2001 for total net worth. Given the high and rising inequality of the wealth distribution, it seems reasonable to assume that asset income streams are also unequally distributed, thus contributing to the rise in overall income inequality.
II.2.3 Mobility
If wage and income inequality were counterbalanced by the potential for economic mobility, then greater inequality would not require that some stay at the bottom (or at the top). However, this is not the case. In the 1970s, 50.7% of families who began the decade in the bottom quintile and 49.1% of families who began the decade in the second bottom quintile moved into a higher quintile over the decade. However, in the 1990s, only 46.8% of families who began the decade in the bottom quintile and 37.9% of families who began the decade in the second bottom quintile moved into a higher quintile (Bradbury and Katz, 2002) .
David Wright has found that class matters more than ever. Sons from the bottom three-quarters of the socioeconomic scale were less likely to move up in the 1990s than in the 1960s. By 1998, only 10% of sons of fathers in the bottom quarter (defined by income, education, and occupation) had moved into the top quarter, whereas by comparison, by 1973, 23% of lower-class sons had moved up to the top. Thus, there is a smaller chance that a low-income family will move up the income ladder over time.
The labor force participation of wives has been critical to the story of mobility. Recent research has found that families where wives had high and rising employment rates, work hours, and pay were more likely to move up the income ladder or maintain their position, rather than fall down the ladder (Bradbury and Katz, 2004) . But, even the large increase in labor supply of women (and mothers, in particular) has not been sufficient to counterbalance declining mobility overall.
III. Macro Economic Background
At the same time that inequality rose, the U.S. saw rising debt levels, increased economic distress of households, less productive investment relative to corporate resources, accelerated productivity growth and slower consumption growth.
With income lagging, households increased their consumption by saving less and borrowing more 3 . The personal savings rate declined from an average high of 9.7% in the early 1970s to 4.7% in the 1990s and to 2.2% in the latest business cycle (table 3) . At the same time, consumer debt, especially mortgage debt, rose rapidly from 63.7% of disposable income in the early 1970s to over 100% in the most recent business cycle.
The rise in consumer debt ultimately boosted the economic distress of households. From 2001 to 2003, households had to dedicate at least 13% of their income to service their debts -the highest proportion since the Federal Reserve began keeping track in 1980 (figure 5). Charge-off rates have remained high throughout the recession and the recovery, with, for instance, credit card charge-off rates above 5% of all loans since 2001 (BOG, 2004a) . Also, personal bankruptcies have continued to rise at the same time. By 2003, the share of households that declared bankruptcy continued to climb for the third year in a row, reaching an estimated 1.5% in 2003 (figure 6). That is, even with low interest rates, households became increasingly financially distressed.
Thus, incentives to use the additional corporate resources for real investments were blunted. Instead, firms increased their share repurchases and dividend pay-outs. While in the 1970s, corporations used 10.7% of their resources for these purposes, this share grew to more than 30% since the 1980s (table 4) . At the same time, capital expenditures continuously lost in importance as a use of internal resources (table 4) .
Despite laggard investment, productivity accelerated. Compared to other early recovery periods, this was the first time during which productivity growth actually outpaced aggregate demand growth in the first two years of a recovery (figure 7). Measured as business cycle averages, productivity growth in 2002 and 2003 was higher than in previous business cycles, although the economy sustained productivity growth that was almost as high for a period of four years in the late 1940s (table 5) .
Reflecting the weakness in demand and the divergence between supply and demand, consumption growth slowed down since 2001 (table 5) . For 2002 and 2003, average real consumption growth was 1.9%, compared to 3.2% in the 1990s. This was the slowest consumption increase of any post-war business cycle. However, consumption never slowed during the most recent recession, unlike during prior ones and consumer spending on new homes and home renovations accelerated more than it had in previous recoveries. Thus, the combined effect of consumer spending on consumption and on residential fixed investment was a growth contribution that was on average higher than actual growth, reflecting the continued expansion of the trade deficit and the slowdown in investment after 2000 (table 5) . Seeing that much of residential fixed investment is debt financed, the figures on consumer spending suggest a slowdown in consumer spending at a time of rising inequality and an increase in debt financed household investments.
IV.
Explaining the Rise in Inequality
IV.1 Inequality between Capital and Labor Incomes
A number of factors contributed to the rise in inequality between capital and labor. The two most convincing explanations are increasing trade intensity and changes in the institutional make-up of U.S. corporations that gave more power to institutional investors and managers and reduced the influence of labor unions (Bivens and Weller, 2004a; Lazonick and O'Sullivan, 2000) .
Increased trade, especially in manufactured goods, is a non-negligible factor in explaining the rise in inequality. About a third of the loss of manufacturing jobs that occurred from the end of 2000 to the end of 2003 -the largest driving force of the 'job loss' recovery -can be attributed to rising trade deficits in manufactured goods (Bivens, 2004; Atkinson 2004 ). This result is consistent with standard trade theory. The predicted structure of trade for a nation like the U.S. -labor-intensive imports and capital-intensive exports -implies that trade should lead to a decline in the demand for labor and rise in the demand for capital, moving wages (down) and profit rates (up) accordingly.
During the 1970s and 1980s, the main distributional impact of trade seemed to be on the distribution of wages; as trade raised the return to skilled labor and lowered the return to unskilled labor (Cline, 1997). The relative lack of a capital/labor income dimension of trade was consistent with what economists dubbed "Leontief's Paradox": the finding that U.S. exports were not notably capital-intensive, nor were U.S. imports labor-intensive. What really seemed to distinguish U.S. trade in the 1970s and 1980s was that it was particularly biased against blue-collar workers (Borjas and Ramey, 1996) . That is, for most of the period that we are interested in, trade can explain an increase in the within labor inequality, but not a rise in the inequality between labor and income.
Another factor that explains the divergent trends between capital and labor is a rising imbalance in the corporate governance realm. Specifically, a growing concentration among institutional shareholders and rising power of managers in deciding corporate resource allocations was juxtaposed by a declining unionization rate.
A greater reliance on managed assets in household savings led to a rising concentration of shares in the hands of mutual funds, brokers, public and private pension funds and insurance companies. In 1952, institutional investors owned less than 10% of outstanding equities, and in 2004, it surpassed 50% for the first time (BOG, 2004c) . Also, institutional investors had growing incentives to use this opportunity to allocate resources towards capital. Starting in the 1970s, institutional changes, such as the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 and the introduction of 401(k) plans, gave fund managers and households a common interest in maximizing asset returns (Bivens and Weller, 2004a) . This altered the way corporations were run, creating a new class of professional managers that enjoyed greater freedom in allocating corporate resources towards a strategy of rent extraction, including downsizing, outsourcing, and restructuring, as well as a reorientation towards financial service activities, away from actual production (Lazonick and O'Sullivan, 2000; O'Sullivan, 2000) . Consequently, labor compensation declined, along with union representation as jobs especially in manufacturing were lost. Thus, the allocation of corporate resources towards faster profit growth proceeded with less opposition than in the past. Profits in turn were increasingly used for dividend pay-outs and share repurchases, which directly benefited executives, whose compensation was dependent on the performance of a company's share value.
Corporate governance changes explain the rise in income inequality in important ways. For one, they explain a growing emphasis of profit generation, thus shrinking the allocation of corporate resources towards labor. They also explain the growing inequality within labor as a result of more rent extracting activities and executive compensation contingent on share price performance. Finally, the latter aspect also explains the growing share of personal income that is derived from assets, which in turn contributes to the rise in income inequality due to the unequal distribution of household wealth.
IV.2 Inequality within Labor
One of the most common retorts to the declining wages of most male workers during the 1970s was the concurrent slowdown in productivity. However, this only provides a partial explanation of slow wage growth and rising inequality. As productivity picked up during the 1990s, wage growth has not kept pace. Over the past decade, productivity has risen by about 50%, but average compensation has increased by 30 to 35% (Mishel et al., 2005) . At the same time, the share of national income going to capital, or profits, has increased dramatically. It is also important to note that lower productivity growth in other Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries did not lead to rapidly rising inequality.
Because increasing inequality has occurred along so many dimensions, the reasons for its rise are not easy to pinpoint on a single source or in a single regression. No one analysis could explain rising wage inequality and family income inequality, while simultaneously addressing the increasing limitations on economic mobility. However, we can discern from years of research a number of critical factors that have created the conditions for rising inequality, which coalesce around the notion of reduced bargaining power for workers, especially low-and moderate-wage workers. The concentration of financial market power, combined with declining bargaining power-decline in unionization, deregulation and privatization, assaults on social programs, a lack of increase in the minimum wage, and an inequitable distribution of health care-all contribute the power imbalance of workers with respect to employers and the state.
The level of unemployment is critical in explaining changes in inequality-higher unemployment leads to inequality growth and inequality tends to shrink during periods of tight labor markets. This is because unemployment affects the fortunes of those at the bottom of the labor market more than those at the top. Individuals with limited education or who earn in the bottom of the wage distribution are more likely to lose a job when unemployment rises. The mechanisms through which unemployment affects wages are not always direct, but, at their core, they are related to the relative power of labor and capital within the U.S. economy. If workers are fearful of losing their job, because of high levels of unemployment, they will be less likely to bargain hard for higher wages and less able to search for a new position at a higher wage (or benefit) level.
Structural changes in the U.S. economy are also implicated in inequality's growth. The decline in unionization, the lessoning of labor market regulation, changes in the industrial and occupation mix of jobs, and globalization have all contributed to growing inequality. A declining real minimum wage and deunionization can explain about onethird of the growth in wage inequality, while globalization-immigration, trade, and capital mobility-can explain another one-third of inequality's rise (DiNardo et al., 1996; Gottschalk 1997; Lee; Card et al., 2003) Growing inequality is also the result of a lack a broad-based social insurance system. Once an American becomes poor, it is exceedingly difficult to rise back up into the middle class. The OECD has found that in the U.S., there are not only more poor families, but they are less likely than the poor in other countries to "exit" from poverty. For example, while 41.1% of poor Germans exit poverty each year, only 29.5% of poor Americans do. Because income transfers are so small, the only way out of poverty is earnings or marriage; this has left U.S. poor people more likely to exit poverty through earnings than in other OECD nations. Yet, because of limited growth in wages among low-wage workers over the past few decades (up until the late 1990s), this led to lower poverty exit rates in the U.S. Thus, the U.S. social welfare state does not help to reduce inequality through helping families back into the middle class; further, the U.S. has more wage and income inequality than any other OECD country (Mishel et al., 2003) .
In general, the U.S. labor market has become an increasingly insecure place for workers. As they emerged from the stagflation of the 1970s, U.S. firms made the case to government and to workers that they needed more control over workers and that could not afford to compete internationally while paying decent wages and benefits. Much of the blame for stagflation was placed on labor's "unreasonable" demands. The plant closings and outsourcing that happened over the next decade-the decimation of manufacturing and the unions-scared policymakers as well as labor unions. For example, one trend in the U.S. has been for cities and states to compete with one another to reduce taxes to lure and keep employers in their locality, often without requiring anything of the firms in exchange. At the same time, the responsibility for ensuring a living wage has fallen more to the government than to low-wage employers, as low wages are supplemented by the Earned Income Tax Credit, even as the inflation-adjusted minimum wage declined markedly. Further, no longer can a worker assume that they will stay in a job for their career. Internal labor markets are increasingly a thing of the past.
V.
Inequality and the Macro Economy
V. 1 Inequality and Innovation
If the rise in the profit share translates into an increase in the profit rate, which was the case for the U.S. in the past few decades, it may result in more investment and thus potentially in more growth since greater profits provide firms with more incentives to invest. This is especially true if tax policy supports the increase in the profit rate, as was the case in the U.S. (Bivens and Weller, 2004b; Palomba, 2002) . However, this link is ambiguous. A greater profit rate may attract more entrants into an industry and reduce the rate of profit below what was originally expected (Peretto, 1995) . Also, profit rate gains may have been generated by reducing wage growth, which may suppress demand growth and thus profit growth over time (Palley, 1996) . A related concern arises from the way profits were generated in the first place. Through rent extraction, many core activities of a firm are abandoned. This may impede organizational learning and thus innovation and growth (Lazonick and O'Sullivan, 2000; O'Sullivan, 2000) . These concerns, though, do not necessarily contradict the original notion that a higher profit rate will lead to more investments. They do suggest, however, that over time countervailing forces will gain ground and weaken the link.
Also, a longstanding issue of debate has been the link between income inequality and innovation and thus economic growth. One argument in favor of a positive effect of inequality on innovation and thus on growth posits that more inequality implies a greater wage premium on skills and thus encourages skill development and innovation. The opposing view, though, contends that rising inequality tends to lead to growing political instabilities, and thus to disincentives for accumulation, followed by reduced innovation (Alesina and Perotti, 1996; Larrain and Vergara, 1997; Rodriguez, 2000) . Somewhat of a compromise position has been offered recently by a few researchers who argue that there is a threshold below which inequality fosters growth, but above which political instability considerations outweigh skill development effects (Benhabib, 2003; Chen, 2003) . The result is a hump-shaped relationship between inequality and innovation.
However, the findings of the theoretical and empirical literature are largely inconclusive as to the effect of inequality on innovation. Some researchers have found a positive, albeit small effect of inequality on growth (Scully, 2002) , while others found a negative relationship between the two (Alesina and Perotti, 1996; Panizza, 2002; Rodriguez, 2000; Rupasingha et al., 2002) . Also, the contention that income inequality in the U.S. has resulted in greater productivity growth due to better skill development does not seem to enjoy empirical support (Appelbaum and Weller, 2001; Osberg, 2003; Mishel et al., 2000) . The findings of a link between inequality and growth, though, appear to be sensitive to the empirical model's specification (Crafts, 1992; Panizza, 2002) .
The literature provides no clear evidence for a positive link between inequality and productivity growth. On the face of it, this argument seems hard to sustain based on data for the U.S. The existing evidence on skill development and on earnings inequality provides little support for a connection between rising inequality and accelerated productivity growth (Mishel et al., 2001; Mishel et al., 2005) .
One way to evaluate the link between inequality and productivity growth is to look at the wage premiums paid by skill levels at a time, when productivity growth accelerated in the late 1990s (Mishel et al., 2001; Mishel et al., 2005; Appelbaum and Weller, 2001) . From the late 1970s to the mid-1990s, wages declined, especially for young high school graduates. By the late 1990s, they had not recovered to the levels of the late 1970s. Also, entry-level wages among male college graduates were stagnant from 1973 to 1989 and fell 9.9% from 1989 to 1995. However, between 1995 and 1999 among young college graduates, real wages rose 14.9% for men and 9.4% for women.
The pattern of wage growth in which there is a rising differential in wages between college-educated workers and less educated workers has persisted in the 1990s. Even though this is often referred to as a "skill premium", the terminology is somewhat misleading. Wage trends for workers with post-secondary education, but less than a fouryear college degree, have followed those of workers with a high school degree. Thus, "less educated" does not refer to the 10% of workers who never earned a high school degree or equivalent but to the nearly three-quarters of the workforce that did not graduate from a four-year college. Moreover, through 1995, the growth in the collegenoncollege premium was due to a sharp drop in the wages of workers with less than a college degree, and not to a rapid increase in the wages of the college educated. Between 1995 and 1999, wages for both groups of workers rose, but those of college educated workers rose more rapidly (Appelbaum and Weller, 2001 ).
Other evidence also casts doubt on a strong link between wage inequality by skill levels and productivity growth. Wage inequality rose fastest in the 1980s, when productivity growth was not faster than during the 1970s, when wage inequality did not rise. Also, wage inequality continued to increase into the 1990s, while productivity growth remained subdued. Finally, when productivity growth accelerated in the 1990s, there was no matching inequality increase (Mishel et al, 2001; Mishel et al., 2005) .
If inequality was technology driven, the differential between low and middle wage should widen. But most of what explains the rise in wage inequality is a pulling away of the top 10% of wage earners in the 1990s, while the differential between low and middle wage earners was stagnant (Mishel et al., 2001; Mishel et al., 2005) .
Finally, the occupational breakdown of the education wage differential casts further doubt on the link between wage inequality and productivity. If new technologies were the main explanation for the rise in wage inequality -regardless of the causality -we would expect technical professions to be the largest gainers. However, the occupations that account for the largest education wage differentials were managers and sales workers. Also, as Mishel et al. (2001:199) document "[i]n contrast, engineers, scientists, mathematicians, and computer science professionals (and associated technical workers) played a very small role in driving up education differentials."
The evidence on the link between inequality and innovation suggests two things. First, the underlying causes of rising inequality between labor and capital are rising trade imbalances in manufacturing and a corporate governance shift that emphasizes rent extraction over rent creation. Either way, corporate investment is reduced below levels where it otherwise would be and thus future innovation could be hampered. Second, the data do not support a link between rising inequality within labor and innovation. In fact, during a period of accelerated innovation, inequality actually declined in the late 1990s.
V.2 Inequality and Demand
The consequences of the two types of income inequality on aggregate demand should be most noticeable on the consumption side of the economy. If the labor share of national income declines, aggregate demand could fall as consumption growth slows. This is a basic contention in the argument linking labor market outcomes to financial stability (Palley, 2004; Weller and Singleton, 2004; Weller et al., 2003) .
This effect could be exacerbated if inequality within labor rises, too. A greater concentration of total income among higher income earners may reduce aggregate demand growth as higher income earners have a lower marginal propensity to consume and thus are more prone to save than lower income households (Keynes, 1936) . Empirical analyses of macro data show that inequality does indeed reduce growth of aggregate demand (Arestis and Howell, 1995; Brown, 2004; Pressman, 1997) .
However, research based on micro data appears to be somewhat ambivalent. Specifically, savings incentives should be relatively most effective for high income earners and least effective for low income earners. An analysis using micro data to study the effectiveness of savings incentives, such as 401(k)s and IRAs, tend to find the opposite (Engen and Gale, 2000) . Because the marginal income tax rates in the Internal Revenue Code rise with income, higher income earners enjoy a larger tax incentive than lower income earners 4 . However, savings incentives seem to be more effective in raising savings for low income earners and not for high income ones.
The empirical evidence on the connection between inequality and aggregate consumption seem inconclusive. Again, on the face of it, the figures do not necessarily support the notion that rising inequality can lead to declining consumption. For instance, the share of consumption relative to disposable income, one of the measures that should decline with inequality actually increases as inequality rises (table 4) . In fact, the correlation coefficient of the share of consumption out of disposable income with the aggregate share of income of the 20% of households with the lowest incomes is a negative 0.8, while it is a positive 0.9 for the correlation between consumption as share of disposable income and the share of income earned by the top 20%.
VI. Inequality, Consumer Debt, and Financial Distress
The literature on the connection between income inequality and the macro economy suggests no link to innovation. On the demand side, though, the evidence is ambivalent. It is possible that both effects are occurring at the same time. Inequality has been increasing due to below average income growth at the bottom of the income distribution. This should have led to an above average decline in consumption without compensating increases in other resources to finance consumption for low and moderate income households, such as more consumer debt (Brown, 2004) . If debt increased in response to rising inequality, especially at the low end of the income scale, the overall effect of rising inequality could still have been a reduction in consumption that was partially compensated by faster debt growth among low income households. As a result, slower income growth would actually be associated with constant consumption increases, while overall consumption levels would still be lower than would otherwise be the case.
For this to be true, though, the supply of credit has to increase in response to rising inequality, assuming that credit rationing exists. Some researchers have argued that in fact the rise in inequality has given way to an endogenous development of credit markets (Kruger and Perri, 2002) .
Access to consumer credit increased over the past decades and these increases appear to have been concentrated among lower and moderate income households. First, mortgage rates became more predictable due to the introduction of long-term fixed rate mortgages. The standardization of mortgages and the introduction of mortgage backed securities took shape in the 1960s with the creation of Ginnie Mae under the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, the creation of Freddie Mac, the engagement of Fannie Mae in the pass-through market under the Emergency Home Finance Act of 1970, and tax advantages for mortgages under the 1986 Tax Reform Act (Vandell, 2000) . These innovations helped to reduce the risks for mortgage lenders and lowered the costs of mortgages (Van Order, 2002) . One result has been a gradual decline in real interest rates (figure 8). Pearce and Miller (2001) estimated that the costs savings to consumers amounted to somewhere between $8.4 billion to $23.5 billion.
Second, financial innovation increased credit access. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 phased out the deductibility of most non-mortgage interest and introduced new marginal tax rates that reduced the tax advantage of all types of debt. This led to a shift of consumer debt towards mortgages and home equity lines (Dunsky and Follain, 2000; Stango, 1999) . Stango (1999) estimates that by 1991 aggregate mortgage debt was over one percent higher, credit card debt approximately 14% lower, and auto loan debt approximately 9% lower than they would have been without these changes. Since the early 1990s, home equity lines have grown relative to disposable income and as a share of total consumer credit, reaching their highest levels in early 2004 (figure 9).
Third, increased competition in the financial services industry also gave many households more access to credit. Specifically, competition among credit card providers gave financial institutions incentives to offer credit cards to clients that were previously underserved (Manning, 2000) . Consequently, credit card debt has risen over the past few decades, either relative to disposable income or as share of total consumer debt (figure 10). The relative increases of credit card debt appear to be larger among lower income households than among higher income households, although the absolute increases are still larger for higher income households (Manning, 2000; Yoo, 1996) .
It seems, though, that credit other than credit cards, particularly non-bank credit also expanded in response to rising inequality, especially among lower income households. These types of loans, including payday loans, pawnbroking, rent-to-own and appliance title loans, and tax refund anticipation loans grew and were concentrated among low-income customers (Barr, 2001; CFA, 1998 CFA, , 1999 Stegman and Faris, 2003) .
At the same time that both types of income inequality rose, consumers gained easier access to credit. This should offset the adverse effects of rising inequality on consumption. Higher debt service costs, though, could outweigh the added impulse to consumption from more debt. In particular, household sources have to equal their uses:
The change in consumption, C, is thus equal to the change in disposable income, Y, plus the change in debt, D, minus the change in net transfers, Tr, minus the change in assets, A, minus the change in interest payments, I. Assuming that borrowing is the only thing that keeps consumption going, consumption can increase as long as new debt is larger than the increases in interest payments. Increases in interest payments are:
such that the growth of household debt has to be greater than the percentage point increase in the interest rate. The figures from past business cycles show that debt has played a larger role in financing consumption in this business cycle than in any previous ones and that debt changes were indeed greater than changes in interest payments (table  6) . 5 Specifically, personal income became a negative contributor to changes in consumption, meaning that consumption growth was larger than personal income growth. Also, since the 1980s, debt growth has outpaced consumption growth helping to finance the gap left by slower income growth. Yet, despite faster debt growth, interest payments were unchanged and even declined relative to consumption spending since the 1980s.
For debt and consumption to rise simultaneously, income either has to go up or interest rates have to go down, or both. We already saw that debt and consumption have gone up at the same time, while income growth has been lagging at least behind consumption growth (table 6). At the same time, though, interest rates have been falling in nominal and real terms (figure 8).
VI.1 Inequality and Consumer Debt
More consumer credit may result from rising inequality. This may be the result of endogenous credit market developments that increase the credit supply, especially to low and middle income households to maintain consumption. While this result should primarily hold for the link between within labor inequality and debt, it is possible that this also occurs in reaction to rising inequality between capital and labor. One example are lower cost consumer loans to maintain sales in the face of low income growth.
Under credit rationing, realized credit is equal to the credit supply (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1980) . Our credit measure is the ratio of household credit relative to disposable income. Our explanatory variables are standard measures of collateral -expected income gains -and interest that we supplement with measures of inequality. Specifically, we use real disposable income lagged once and the real mortgage rate. In addition, we use the labor share of national income as a measure for inequality between capital and labor. To account for within labor inequality we use two measures, one for wage inequality and a proxy for wealth inequality and thus capital income inequality. Our wage inequality measure is the ratio of the income limits for the top decile and the bottom decile. As a proxy of wealth inequality, we use the ratio of the stock market index to the housing price index (Wolff, 2002b) . Our regression equation is thus: 3) where LI is labor income, NI is national income, Atkinson05 is Atkinson's inequality measure calibrated with a parameter of 0.5, SP500 refers to the S&P 500 index and HPI to the housing price index, y is real disposable income, r is the real mortgage rate, and ε is a randomly distributed error term. Data for labor income, national income, and disposable income come from BEA (2004a); data for the Atkinson's inequality measure is from CEPR (2004); data for the S&P 500 is from Yahoo! Finance (2004) ; data for the Housing Price Index is from OFHEO (2004) ; and interest rate data are from BOG (2004d). Income inequality is likely to affect debt over the course of some time, so that we use the average of the four quarters ending in the current quarter for all of our inequality measures 6 . In each case the natural logarithm is used. Table 7 presents our results for the determinants of total household debt. The first regression presents our baseline results with the expected positive signs for the explanatory variables. In regression (2), we add our measure for inequality between capital and labor. We would expect this measure to have a negative sign indicating that a greater distribution of national economic resources towards labor is less likely to give rise to endogenous credit expansions and thus less likely to lead to an increase in the credit supply, ceteris paribus. This measure is statistically insignificant. In regression (3), we add our two measures for income inequality. Again, neither one is statistically significant. Regression (4) introduces an alternative measure for inequality between capital and labor. Now, we consider proprietors' income as part of total labor compensation. This generates a statistically significant, yet positive correlation between inequality and the amount of debt. One explanation for this unexpected sign may be that more labor income may also constitute more collateral for households to borrow against. In regressions (5) and (6) we test the robustness of our results with respect to within labor inequality. In regression (5), we replace the Atkinson measure with the 0.5 calibration factor with the Atkinson measure with a 1.0 calibration factor. The results essentially remain the same. One problem with our labor income inequality measures may arise from the fact that both are highly correlated. To circumvent this problem, we combine both measures using factor analysis. We first standardize both variable and then calculate the principal factors. We use only the first factor to generate a new variable "labor inequality", which is a linear combination of the two separate variables and explains 89% of the variance of both variables. Using this new variable instead of two separate measures for labor inequality generates regression (6). The results are again largely robust.
So far, we do not find a link between inequality and household debt. One explanation may be that total household debt is too broad a category to be affected by inequality. Borrowing by high and low income households in response to rising inequality may have had offsetting effects. Specifically, higher income earners are more likely than lower income households to own a home and thus be able to borrow against their real estate (Wolff, 2002b (Wolff, , 2004 . Income inequality rose because incomes of higher income earners pulled away from the middle. Thus, households that were more likely to own their residence also had more collateral to borrow against, but less need to borrow additional money. In comparison, lower income households saw below average income gains as inequality rose, but also had fewer opportunities to borrow against their own homes. As they had a greater need to borrow, but less collateral, the literature suggests that a cycle of endogenous credit expansion took place, which may have manifested itself in a disproportionate increase in credit card debt among low income households. Thus, we estimate our results separately for mortgages (table 8) and credit card debt (table 9) 7 . Table 8 presents our results for mortgage debt. We find a consistent positive and statistically significant relationship between the labor share of national income and mortgage debt, suggesting that less labor income allowed fewer households to buy a home and borrow against the value of their real estate than otherwise would have been the case. A 1% decline in the four quarter average of labor's share of national income translated into a 1% decrease in the ratio of mortgage debt to disposable income. The results also show that the rising inequality in the distribution of wage earnings had an adverse effect on mortgage debt. A rise in earnings inequality translated into less mortgage debt as well. Thus, our results suggest that the increasing unequal distribution between capital and labor away from labor and the rising inequality of labor income lowered the amount of mortgage below where it otherwise would have been.
Our results on mortgage debt stand in contrast to our results on credit card debt (table 9). We find no connection between an increasingly unequal distribution between capital and labor and the amount of credit card debt, but we find that greater inequality within labor results in more credit card debt, regardless of which measure is used. For instance, a 1% increase in wage inequality has typically resulted in a 0.5% increase in credit card debt relative to disposable income. For the period from 1980 to 2003, our inequality measure had a standard deviation that was 6.5% of its mean. Thus, a one standard deviation increase would explain a 3.2% increase in debt relative to disposable income. This is a small fraction of the total increase in credit card debt relative to disposable income as it rose almost fourfold over the period from 1980 to 2003. In comparison, a 1% increase in our capital income proxy translated into an increase of 0.1% in the ratio of credit card debt to disposable income. The standard deviation of our capital income inequality proxy was 56% of its average, which would have meant a 5.6% increase in the ratio of credit card debt to disposable income.
Thus, changes in labor inequality explain only a small fraction of credit card debt relative to disposable income, which rose almost fourfold from 1980 to 2004. This is, however, only the average effect of inequality on credit card debt. If rising inequality is largely due to slow income growth at the bottom and increases in credit card debt are also concentrated there, the link is likely much stronger by income groups.
One way to combine the results on mortgage debt and credit card debt is to use the share of credit card debt out of total debt as the dependent variable (table 10). The results show that the trend towards rising inequality between labor and capital and within labor has resulted in a larger share of credit card debt relative to total household debt over the period from 1980 to 2003. As the labor share of national income has trended downward, households increasingly shifted their borrowing towards credit card debt, possibly because it was more accessible than mortgage debt. A 1% decrease in the labor share of national income resulted in a 2% increase in the relative borrowing from credit cards. Also, increasing inequality within labor led to a growing share of credit card debt relative to total debt. A 1% increase in wage inequality, averaged over four quarters, translated into an increase of 0.6% in the relative size of credit card debt and a 1% increase in capital income inequality translated into a 0.1% increase in the share of credit card debt. The size of the effects is comparable to their impact on the volume of credit.
VI.2 Inequality and Household Economic Distress
The rise in consumer debt could also have given rise to household economic distress if it was more pronounced for lower income households (Iyigun and Owen, 1997) . The increase in debt levels, caused by a growing disparity between labor and capital, should increase financial distress. So should the rise in within labor inequality as more costly credit card debt disproportionately increases among lower income earners. Already, the largest increases in consumer default exist with respect to credit card debt. The charge-off rate on credit card loans increased almost threefold from 2.0% in 1985 to 5.9% at the end of 2003, while it only doubled on other consumer loans and declined on real estate loans (residential and commercial combined) (BOG, 2004a).
The rise in economic distress measures is somewhat surprising given the fundamental characteristics of household finances. Importantly, the debt service burden rose from an average of 11.9% in the early 1980s to 13.0% since 1999, a 9% increase (figure 11). At the time, though, household debt relative to disposable income rose from 78.0% to 105.8%, or a 36% increase (figure 11). Moreover, calculations based on data from the Fed (BOG, 2004c) show that household wealth relative to disposable income grew at the same time, too. Thus, as households borrowed more, their assets increased even faster, while the burden of repaying the debt rose much more slowly.
Based on these figures, one would not necessarily expect a rise in economic distress, but that is exactly what has happened. Personal bankruptcies, as a share of households rose fourfold from 0.4% in 1980 to 1.5% in 2003 (Weller and Chaurushiya, 2004) . Further, default rates on consumer credit almost doubled from the early 1980s to the period since 1999, while consumer credit relative to disposable income increased only by 23.4% (figure 12). Thus, household economic distress clearly seems to have grown faster than one would expect by merely looking at household debt measures.
Increasing inequality may explain this divergence. Rising inequality may have given rise to an endogenous credit expansion and thus a larger credit supply, especially to those households that saw the smallest income increases, i.e. low and moderate income households (Bird et al., 1998; Black and Morgan, 1999) . Additionally, lenders may have screened their customers carefully and offered worse terms to customers that were more likely to become delinquent on their payments than to others (Ausubel, 1999; Stavins, 2000) . Combined with the lack of upward mobility, low and moderate income households may have been caught in an increasing cycle of economic distress, caused by the combination of low income growth, high debt growth, and high debt costs. Thus, both types of inequality may have contributed to a rise in economic distress due to the ensuing demand for credit and the extension of rising, and more costly credit, such as credit card debt (Chatterjee et al., 2002; Gross and Souleles, 1998; Stavins, 2000) .
Our regression model to estimate the link between income inequality and economic distress builds on the existing literature and extends it by including our three income inequality measures. We use three measures of economic distress, personal bankruptcy, charge-off rates on all consumer credit and charge-off rates on credit card debt. The inclusion of inequality measures in addition to debt service and debt composition essentially controls for the fact that credit may have expanded in forms not captured here, e.g. payday loans and pawnshops. Economic distress is typically a function of income growth, debt composition, out-of-pocket medical expenditures, debt service, and unemployment, in addition to demographic characteristics (Ausubel, 1997; Chaterjee et al., 2002; Gross and Souleles, 1998; Stavins, 2000) . We supplement this model with our measure for between labor and capital inequality and within labor inequality: Where BR refers to the total number of quarterly bankruptcy cases, at an annualized rate, HH refers to the total number of households 8 , MEX to total medical expenditures, CCR to credit card debt, TC to total household credit, and DS to debt service ratio. The source for medical expenditures is BEA (2004a), the source for the unemployment rate is BLS (2004c), and the source for debt service is BOG (2004b). To make the results comparable for both our economic distress variables, we estimate the regression for the period from 1985 to 2003 9 .
Table 11 summarizes our regression results for all of our economic distress variables, personal bankruptcies and charge-off rates 10 . All explanatory variables either have the expected sign or are statistically insignificant. Regression (1) presents our baseline results for personal bankruptcies. The share of households declaring bankruptcy in a given year is negatively related to income growth, positively to medical expenditures, to the composition of debt and to debt service. Also, inequality between labor and profits does not affect the bankruptcy rate as regression (2) shows. However, inequality within labor, especially arising from wealth inequality, results in a higher personal bankruptcy rate as our results in regression (3) suggest. Using our combined labor inequality measure in regression (4) does not change the results materially. A rise in labor inequality by 1% results in a rise in the personal bankruptcy rate by 0.2%. Thus, a one-standard deviation increase in labor inequality, which equals 217% of the average labor inequality, would result in a 39% increase in the personal bankruptcy rate. In comparison, though, the personal bankruptcy rate rose by 473% from 1985 to 2003.
Thus, rising inequality within labor has significantly contributed to the increase in personal bankruptcies, but it does not explain the majority of the increase. Again, it is important to keep in mind that this is an average effect that ignores the fact that slow income growth at the bottom of the income scale went hand-in-hand with a disproportionate increase of credit card debt, non-bank loans and economic distress among lower income households. Thus, the effect is likely more pronounced by income.
The results differ somewhat for the regressions on charge-off rates on consumer credit and credit card debt (table 11) . For instance, the unemployment rate, instead of personal income growth, is a significant indicator of default. Higher unemployment rates raise the rate of default, which may be a reflection of the fact that unemployment rates are more volatile among low and middle income households, where the expansion of credit card debt has been more pronounced. However, health care expenditures did not play a significant role in determining default rates, which may reflect the fact that health care coverage and thus out of pocket medical expenditures are unequally distributed. Further, the debt service burden has a much more pronounced effect on default rates than on personal bankruptcies as the size of the effect almost doubles. A 1% increase in the debt service burden raises the default rate by 1.7-1.9% as regressions (5) through (8) show. The effect of the within labor inequality on charge-off rates is similar to that on personal bankruptcy rates as they also rose fourfold from 1985 to 2003.
VII. Conclusion
In this paper, we look at the macro economic effects of rising inequality in the U.S. The distribution of national income between capital and labor has become more unequal as has the distribution within labor. At the same time that inequality rose, consumer debt and household economic distress grew, too. The evidence on a positive link between rising inequality and innovation is not supported by the data. The data either suggest no connection or a potential negative link.
In comparison, the link between growing inequality and aggregate demand is somewhat ambiguous since macro economic data show a negative connection that is not supported by the micro data. One way to clarify this ambiguity is the possibility that debt has increased and that it has increased more among low income households. This seems to be the effect, especially when considering more costly forms of debt, such as credit cards and non-bank credit. We find that credit card debt is especially sensitive to changes in inequality and that rising inequality may thus have contributed to the stark increases in personal bankruptcies in the U.S. However, while our results show that rising inequality has played a non-trivial role in the expansion of some forms of credit and that it has contributed to the large increases in economic distress over the past two decades, it explains only a small part of the overall increases in debt levels and in economic distress. Yet, a look at aggregate data ignores the fact that changes in inequality, consumer credit and economic distress likely affected lower income households more than others. Notes: All figures are in percent. Mortgages comprise both traditional mortgages and home equity loans. Consumer credit refers to revolving consumer credit, such as credit card debt, and non-revolving credit card debt, such as car loans. Source is Bivens and Weller (2004a) . Notes: In each case, a Prais-Winsten regression is used. LPI refers to labor income plus proprietors' income and Atkinson10 refers to the Atkinson inequality measure with 1.0 parameter instead of 0.5. LIneq refers to the combined labor inequality measure derived by using the first factor. All inequality measures refer to the four quarter average ending in the current quarter. Figures in parentheses are standard deviations. * denotes significance at the 10%-level, ** denotes significance at the 5%-level, and *** denotes significance at the 1%-level. Notes: In each case, a Prais-Winsten regression is used. LPI refers to labor income plus proprietors' income and Atkinson10 refers to the Atkinson inequality measure with 1.0 parameter instead of 0.5. LIneq refers to the combined labor inequality measure derived by using the first factor. All inequality measures refer to the four quarter average ending in the current quarter. Figures in parentheses are standard deviations. * denotes significance at the 10%-level, ** denotes significance at the 5%-level, and *** denotes significance at the 1%-level. Notes: In each case, a Prais-Winsten regression is used. Credit card debt refers to the share of revolving credit out of total household debt. LPI refers to labor income plus proprietors' income and Atkinson10 refers to the Atkinson inequality measure with 1.0 parameter instead of 0.5. LIneq refers to the combined labor inequality measure derived by using the first factor. All inequality measures refer to the four quarter average ending in the current quarter. Figures in parentheses are standard deviations. * denotes significance at the 10%-level, ** denotes significance at the 5%-level, and *** denotes significance at the 1%-level. Notes: In each case, a Prais-Winsten regression is used. LPI refers to labor income plus proprietors' income and Atkinson10 refers to the Atkinson inequality measure with 1.0 parameter instead of 0.5. All inequality measures refer to the four quarter average ending in the current quarter. Figures in parentheses are standard deviations. * denotes significance at the 10%-level, ** denotes significance at the 5%-level, and *** denotes significance at the 1%-level. Notes: In each case, a Prais-Winsten regression is used. All inequality measures refer to the four quarter average ending in the current quarter. Figures in parentheses are standard deviations. * denotes significance at the 10%-level, ** denotes significance at the 5%-level, and *** denotes significance at the 1%-level. 
